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Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth:
"Whole-cloth Creation" or Manifestation
of Congressional Intent?
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "Title VII") makes it
unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against
individuals based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The addition of
the word "sex" to the statute by conservative members of Congress, in a last ditch
attempt to torpedo the legislation, resulted in very little legislative history for courts
to use in order to interpret the prohibition against employment discrimination based
on sex.' Among other forms of employment discrimination based on sex addressed
by the Act, Title VII eventually included sexual harassment.'
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court first tackled the issue of employer
liability for sexual harassment under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson.4 In Meritor Savings, the Court affirmed the lower court's holding that sexual
harassment which creates a hostile or abusive work environment violates Title VII.5
However, the Court declined to issue a definitive ruling as to when an employer is
liable for sexual harassment by employees in the workplace.6 Instead, the Court
chose to make a somewhat abstract reference to Congress' intention that courts
utilize the principles of agency when deciding the issue, while indicating that not all
common law agency principles would apply to Title VII.7 This lack of guidance by
the Court as to how and when agency principles should apply to employer liability
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Title VII states in relevant part: "It is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
2. See Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment: Mislabeling
the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 817, 818 n.5 (1994) (stating that adding
the prohibition against sexual discrimination to Title VII was an attempt to derail the legislation).
3. See David Schultz, From Reasonable Man to Unreasonable Victim?: Assessing Harris Forklift
Systems and Shifting Standards of Proof and Perspective in Title VII Sexual Harassment Law, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 722-23 (1993) ("[S]exual harassment has come to be included within the
meaning of sex discrimination under Title VI.").
4. 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
5. See id. at 66.
6. See id. at 72.
7. See id.
for sexual harassment left lower courts struggling with the issue.'
Twelve years later, the Court finally addressed this area of confusion when it
decided Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,9 and its companion case, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton,'o in order to define the appropriate standard of employer liability
for sexual harassment claims under Title VII. In Ellerth, the Court determined that
employers will be held vicariously liable for of supervisors conduct which creates a
hostile and offensive work environment for subordinates, subject to a two-part
affirmative defense." In order to avoid liability for supervisor sexual harassment,
employers must show the following: 1) that they acted reasonably to prevent or
correct the supervisor's harassing behavior, and 2) that the employee acted
unreasonably by not using any corrective procedures that were available. 2
The Court's decision in Ellerth is important for the questions it answered as well
as for those it left unanswered. The Court cleared up the following issues: 1)
whether an employer must have knowledge of harassing conduct by a supervisor to
be liable for sexual harassment; 3 and 2) which principles of agency should an
analysis of sexual harassment claims under Title VII include. 4 However, the Court
left wide open the question of what measures employers must take in order to meet
the requirements of the new affirmative defense, thus leaving employers with very
little guidance in this new area of law. 5
This Note examines the Court's decision in Ellerth and discusses its potential
impact from both a judicial and a practical business perspective. Part II traces the
historical background that is responsible for the development of the Court's sexual
harassmentjurisprudence under Title VII.' 6 Part III presents the facts and procedural
history of Ellerth.' Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in
Ellerth." Part V considers the potential judicial and economic impact of the Ellerth
decision,' 9 and Part VI concludes with speculation on how lower courts will deal
with the Supreme Court's "whole-cloth creation" of new law involving Title VII
sexual harassment claims.2"
8. See Turner, supra note 2, at 831.
9. 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (1998).
10. 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2294 (1998).
11. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
12. See id.
13. See id. (noting that an employer does not need to have knowledge of the harassing conduct).
14. See id. at 2267-70.
15. See id. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16. See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 56-97 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
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1I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Title VII & Sexual Harassment
The Supreme Court announced its interpretation of Title VII in 1971 when it
stated that the statute's purpose was to remove all "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment [specifically] when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica-
tions."'" But even as late as 1976, some courts still refused to recognize sexual
harassment as employment discrimination based on sex under Title VII. 2 One of
three major events that shaped the evolution of sexual harassment litigation under
Title VII occurred in 1980,23 when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter "EEOC") issued guidelines explicitly prohibiting workplace sexual
harassment under Title VII.1
4
The EEOC guidelines provided, inter alia, that an employer should be held
responsible for sexual harassment by supervisors regardless of whether the employer
knew or should have known about the harassing conduct." The guidelines also
provide that an employer should be held responsible for harassment between fellow
workers if the employer knew or should have known about the conduct.26 The
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Other impermissible classifications
include religion, national origin or sex when used as criteria for employment decisions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988).
22. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a supervisor's sexual harassment of subordinate is not actionable
under Title VII because the conduct was merely satisfying 'the supervisor's personal urges); Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3d
Cir. 1977). ( "The abuse of authority.., for personal purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of
our social experience ... [but] [iut is not... sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.").
23. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 723.
24. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION
BECAUSE OF SEX, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
25. See id. at § 1604.11(c).
"[Aln employer ...is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence."
Id.
26. See id. at § 1604.11 (d) ("With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action.").
Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of the EEOC guidelines when it stated
that they "'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance"'. 27 Subsequent to the release of these
guidelines, lower courts began to uniformly allow Title VII discrimination claims
based on allegations that sexual harassment created a hostile and abusive work
environment.2"
B. Forms of Sexual Harassment
Another major event which shaped the evolution of sexual harassment litigation
under Title VII occurred in 1979, when Professor Catherine MacKinnon published
a book2 9 which classified workplace sexual harassment into two possible forms: 1)
quid pro quo; and 2) hostile work environment.3 ° These classifications influenced
the EEOC guidelines, which later recognized these two distinct forms of sexual
harassment."'
1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Quid pro quo sexual harassment is generally described as adverse job action
harassment where a supervisor retaliates for rejected sexual advances by firing,
demoting, or failing to promote or to provide equal benefits to the harassed
subordinate.32 Quid pro quo harassment is violative of Title VII because it presents
a barrier to equal employment treatment based on the sex of an employee.33 Under
a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment, a single instance of harassment which
results in adverse job action is considered actionable, and the employer is held
strictly liable for the conduct of the supervisor or agent involved.34
27. See Meritor Savings, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
28. See Turner, supra note 2, at 825; see also, Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th
Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
901 (11 th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OFWORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
30. See id. at 32, 40.
31. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 723.
32. See Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 307, 309 (1998) (discussing the definition of quid pro quo sexual harassment).
33. See Turner, supra note 2, at 820. Some courts require plaintiffs to prove 5 elements to establish
a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VU: (1) the employee belonged to a
protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment
was based upon sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5)
the harasser was an agent or supervisor of the employer. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d
777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying the 5-part test for quid pro quo harassment); Highlander v. K.F.C.
Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644,648 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982) (same).
34. See Turner, supra note 2, at 821.
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2. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
In 1971, the Fifth Circuit first recognized that Title VII protects employees from a
hostile or offensive work environment in the context of racial discrimination.35 In
198 1, the D.C. Circuit was the first to recognize hostile or offensive work environ-
ment Title VII claims based on sexual harassment.36 Hostile work environment
claims usually involve complaints by an employee of repeated and unwelcome sexual
comments or advances that result in an adverse affect in the terms or conditions of
employment.37 Lower courts have held that not all workplace conduct that an
employee finds harassing rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment.3" For
sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII, it must be so severe and
pervasive that it "alter[s] the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create[s]
an abusive working environment."39 Most federal courts have refused to hold the
employer strictly liable for hostile work environment claims.' The third major event
which shaped the evolution of Title VII litigation occurred when the Supreme Court
finally began to address the issue of hostile work environment sexual harassment.4
C. The Supreme Court's Meritor Savings Bank Decision
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of sexual harassment claims under
Title VII when it decided Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.42 In Meritor
35. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that a racially segregated
waiting room resulted in actionable employment discrimination under Title VII because of its effect on
minority employees).
36. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that sexual harassment
established through claim of hostile work environment was actionable under Title VI).
37. See Turner, supra note 2, at 821.
38. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). "[Mlere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" probably would not affect the
conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII. See id.
39. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982); accord Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
40. See Turner, supra note 2, at 821.
41. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 724.
42. 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Mechelle Vinson was an employee of Meritor Savings Bank who
brought a Title VII claim against her supervisor and her employer claiming that the supervisor subjected
her to repeated acts of sexual harassment. See id. at 60. According to Vinson, her supervisor demanded
sexual favors, had sex with her on forty to fifty occasions, fondled her in front of other employees,
exposed himself to her, and forcibly raped her on several occasions. See id. The bank and the
supervisor denied the allegations, and the bank further asserted that it had no knowledge and did not
approve of any harassing conduct by the supervisor. See id. at 61. The district court denied relief,
holding that because the bank had anti-sexual harassment policies in place and had no notice of
Savings, the Court affirmed that hostile and offensive work environment sexual
harassment is actionable employment discrimination under Title VII.4 ' Even though
the Court acknowledged a "debate over the appropriate standard for employer
liability," it refused to issue a definitive ruling concerning this standard.' The Court
stated that Congress intended courts to look to common law principles of agency for
guidance on employer liability. 5 The Court indicated that not all common law
principles of agency were applicable to Title VII claims, and that Congress clearly
intended to limit liability when it defined "employer" to include agents 6 Problem-
atically, the Court gave no indication as to which principles of agency courts should
use to determine employer liability for hostile work environment harassment under
Title VII.
As a result of this analysis, the Court held as follows: 1) employers are not
automatically vicariously liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment by
supervisors, but that agency principles should be used to determine liability; 2) an
employee's failure to notify his employer of sexual harassment does not necessarily
insulate an employer from liability; and 3) the existence of policies and procedures
against discrimination, coupled with an employee's failure to invoke the procedures,
does not automatically preclude employer liability under Title VII."
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Respondent Kimberly Ellerth quit her job as a salesperson at Burlington
Industries after 15 months, allegedly because she was subjected to constant sexual
harassment from one of her supervisors, Ted Slowick.48 Slowick was a middle-level
manager with authority to hire and promote employees, but was not a policy maker
for Burlington.49 Ellerth described many instances of crude sexual remarks and
gestures on the part of Slowick, including an incident where Slowick made remarks
about Ellerth's breasts and told her to loosen up, warning that he could make her "life
very hard or very easy at Burlington."5 ° While on one occasion Ellerth did tell
Slowick that a comment he made was inappropriate, Ellerth never informed anyone
at Burlington about Slowick's conduct, despite knowing that there was a company
Vinson's claims of harassment, it could not be held liable for the actions of the supervisor. See id. at
62. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that an employer is absolutely
liable for supervisor sexual harassment, whether or not it knows about the misconduct. See id. at 63.
43. See id. at 65.
44. See id. at 72.
45. See id.
46. See id. The limitation on employer liability results from the fact that Congress did not make
employers vicariously liable for the conduct of all employees, but only for those individuals considered
to be agents under the principles of agency. See id. at 73.
47. See id. at 72.
48. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998).
49. See id.
50. See id.
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policy against sexual harassment."
After Ellerth quit her job at Burlington in 1994, she filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the company
violated Title VII and caused her constructive discharge by engaging in sexual
harassment.52 The district court found that although Slowick's conduct did create a
hostile work environment, Burlington neither knew nor should have known about the
conduct, and granted summary judgment to Burlington. 3
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court en banc, but
without a controlling rationale as to the standard for an employer's liability for a
sexual harassment claim under Title VII.54 The United States Supreme Court granted
Burlington's petition for writ of certiorari.55
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer joined. 6 Justice
Kennedy began his analysis by discussing the differences between quid pro quo and
hostile work environment sexual harassment. Justice Kennedy stated that while
both types of claims were actionable under Title VII, quid pro quo harassment was
more obviously "discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment,"
and circuit courts have held employers vicariously liable for the conduct of their
employees for such harassment.58 However, Justice Kennedy noted that the issue
before the court was not whether Ellerth could state a claim for quid pro quo sexual
harassment in order to hold Burlington vicariously liable, but whether Burlington's
liability was limited to its own negligence.59
Justice Kennedy addressed the issue of employer liability where a supervisor
creates a hostile work environment by first acknowledging that Congress directed
federal courts to interpret Title VII using general principles of agency, because Title
51. See id. at 2262-63.
52. See id. at 2263.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 2264.
56. See id. at 2261.
57. See id. at 2264.
58. See id. (discussing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
59. See id. at 2265.
VII defines the term "employer" to include agents.6 ° Justice Kennedy then turned to
the Restatement of Agency to determine the applicable principles for Title VII hostile
work environment claims against an employer.6 Justice Kennedy indicated that the
Restatement sets out the general rule that an employer is liable for the torts of its
employees if they act within the scope of their employment.62 However, he then
reasoned that a supervisor acting out of a desire to fulfill some sexual urge would
probably not be acting to further his employer's interests, and stated that, as a general
rule, "sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of
employment."63
Justice Kennedy then examined other principles of agency that might still impose
liability on an employer for the conduct of an employee, even if the employee is not
acting within the scope of his employment.' The two rules he found generally
applicable to sexual harassment cases against employers follow: 1) those involving
negligence on the part of the employer for failing to stop the conduct; or 2) where the
supervisor was aided in his conduct by the existence of the agency relationship.
Because Ellerth did not allege that Burlington was negligent in the present case, but
rather was claiming it should be held to the stricter standard of vicarious liability,
Justice Kennedy focused his analysis on the "aided in the agency relation"
principle.66
Justice Kennedy noted that the aided in the agency relation standard required
more than the employment relationship itself, otherwise the employer would be
vicariously liable for the conduct of all employees, not just supervisors.67 He stated
that none of the circuit courts which considered the issue arrived at such a result.68
Justice Kennedy then discussed the aided in the agency relation standard as it
pertained to scenarios where a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against
an employee.69 He defined tangible employment actions as those resulting in a
"significant change in employment status," such as being fired or failing to be
promoted.7" Justice Kennedy stated that because tangible employment action can
only be inflicted by a supervisor, or someone else with the authority of the company,
60. See id.
61. See id. at 2266.
62. See id. The Restatement of Agency states that "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of
his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, § 219(l) (1957).
63. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
64. See id.
65. See id. The Restatement states that "[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his
servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: . . . (b) the master was negligent or
reckless, or ... (d) the servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relationship." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219(2) (1957).
66. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
67. See id. at 2268.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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those actions will always meet the requirements of the aided in the agency relation
standard.7 1
Justice Kennedy then discussed the application of the aided in the agency
relation standard to supervisor harassment which did not include the implementation
of tangible employment action.72 He stated that this was a less obvious application
of the standard, but that such harassing conduct is particularly threatening precisely
because it comes from a supervisor, and it is therefore aided by the agency relation. 73
Justice Kennedy also noted that the purpose of Title VII is to deter exactly this sort
of conduct in the workplace, as well as to encourage the creation of adequate anti-
harassment policies and grievance procedures.74
In order to apply agency principles for vicarious liability of an employer, as well
as to being about Title VII's purpose encouraging employers' proactive efforts to
prevent workplace harassment, Justice Kennedy announced the Court's standard for
holding employers vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. 75 He
stated that an employer would be subject to liability for hostile work environment
created by a supervisor, but that if no tangible employment action was taken the
employer can raise a two-part affirmative defense.76 The employer must show the
following: 1) that it acted reasonably to prevent or correct the supervisor's harassing
behavior; and 2) that the employee acted unreasonably by not using any corrective
procedures that were available or by otherwise avoiding the harm.77
Justice Kennedy noted that as a matter of law, every case would not require a
showing of anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures. Instead, parties
should litigate the adequacies of company policies as the first element of the
affirmative defense.78 Justice Kennedy also stated that an employer implementing
a tangible employment action as a result of a supervisor's sexual harassment may not
raise an affirmative defense.79 In applying the Court's decision to the facts of the
case at bar, Justice Kennedy stated that because Ellerth did not allege a tangible
employment action against her, Burlington should be given the chance to assert and
prove the affirmative defense against vicarious liability announced by the Court.80
The Court remanded the case to the district court for that purpose.8
71. See id. at 2269.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 2270.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 2271.
81. See id.
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent to the majority opinion, in which Justice Scalia
joined. 2 Justice Thomas began by discussing the history of employment discrimina-
tion claims under Title VII. He noted that racial discrimination provided the context
in which courts first acknowledged disparate treatment claims 3 as well as hostile
work environment claims.84 He also noted that the standard for a hostile or offensive
work environment under Title VII is the same for both racial and sexual discrimina-
tion claims." Justice Thomas then stated that when an employee sues claiming a
racially hostile work environment, the employer is liable for negligence "only if the
employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the
harassment and failed to take remedial action." 6 He referenced and agreed with the
Court's statement that a supervisor who creates a hostile work environment does not
act in the interest of his employer, and stated his own view that liability should only
attach to the employer in such cases if it acts negligently. 7 Justice Thomas noted
that the Court's ruling will result in the utilization of different standards to determine
employer liability for hostile work environment claims, depending on whether the
claimed discrimination is racial or sexual.88 He stated that the standard should be the
same for both types of Title VII claims; the employer should be held liable only if it
was negligent in permitting the conduct to occur.
8 9
Justice Thomas then discussed the Court's use of section 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement of Agency in order to hold employers liable for the harassing conduct
of supervisors. He took issue with the Court's reasoning that a "supervisor is 'aided
... by ... the agency relation' when creating a hostile work environment because the
supervisor's 'power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a
particular threatening character."' 9' He reasoned that the power and authority of a
supervisor has no bearing on employer liability under section 219(2)(d); rather,
liability depends on the claimant's belief that "the agent acted in the ordinary course
of business or within the scope of his apparent authority."9' Justice Thomas
82. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. "A disparate treatment claim required a plaintiff to prove an adverse employment consequence
and discriminatory intent by his employer." Id. at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 2272-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 2273-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269-70).
91. See id. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While Justice Thomas includes a reference to the
supervisor's apparent authority in his analysis of section 219(d)(2), the Court dismissed that aspect of
the section as being inapplicable in the context of supervisor sexual harassment. See id. at 2268. It is
also interesting to note that Justice Thomas' language concerning the agent "acting in the ordinary
course of business" is not part of section 219(2)(d), which he was ostensibly analyzing. See id. at 2274;
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indicated that no sexually harassed employee could reasonably believe that the
supervisor's conduct was within the ordinary course of business or within the scope
of his apparent authority.92 Therefore, section 219(2)(d) could not be a basis for
holding employers liable for that conduct.93 He repeated his assertion that the only
principle of agency under which an employer should be held liable for a supervisor's
sexual harassment would be if the employer was negligent or reckless in allowing the
harassment to occur.94
Justice Thomas concluded his analysis by voicing his concern that the Court's
new rule of law essentially would equate to strict liability for employers, no matter
how reasonably they act, "so long as the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of
reasonable care to avoid harm." 95 He also expressed concern that the Court provided
little guidance as to how employers might avoid vicarious liability, because the Court
gave essentially no detail on how to assert the two-part affirmative defense. 6 Justice
Thomas summarized his concerns with the following pronouncement:
The Court's holding does guarantee one result: There will be more and more litigation
to clarify applicable legal rules in an area in which both practitioners and the courts
have long been begging for guidance. It thus truly boggles the mind that the Court can
claim that its holding will effect "Congress's intention to promote conciliation rather
than litigation in the Title VII context."97
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S OPINION
Because the Court's decision in Ellerth, which imposes vicarious liability on
employers for supervisor sexual harassment subject to a two-part affirmative defense,
is essentially a "whole-cloth creation," it seems clear that the decision will have
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219(2)(d) (1957). This wording is actually part of
section 261, which concerns a principle's liability for an agent's fraud. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY, § 261 (1957) (stating that the principal is liable for the agent's fraud if "the agent's
position facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person the
transaction seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the
business confided to him.") (emphasis added).
92. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
93. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). This is a reference to the second prong
of the two-prong affirmative defense announced by the Court. See id. at 2270. Because both prongs
need to be met, the affirmative defense will only preclude employer liability if "the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise," no matter how reasonable the efforts of the employer to avoid
and correct any sexually harassing behavior. See id.
96. See id. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2274-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270).
significant impact on both employers and the lower courts.98 The full extent of this
impact will become known after sufficient time has passed for both employers and
employees to react to the Court's pronouncements, but commentators have been
quick to speculate on the potential ramifications of this significant decision.
A. Impact on Employers
1. Increased Costs of Litigation
Prior to the Court's decision in Ellerth, employers were not subject to blanket
vicarious liability in many circuits for the harassing conduct of supervisors unless the
claimant could prove an actual adverse job action.99 The fact that employers are now
potentially liable for any harassing conduct by supervisors, whether quid pro quo
sexual harassment can be proved or not, clearly seems to expose employers to many
more sexual harassment lawsuits than they would have faced before Ellerth.'" The
obvious result of increased sexual harassment litigation for employers will be greater
expenditures of time and money to defend themselves and higher insurance costs to
cover their increased exposure.'0 ' As one commentator noted:
[P]laintiffs have the go-ahead from the Supreme Court to sue the employer and try
their luck. Why not? Maybe the employer will settle, at a pretty price, just to avoid
an expensive fight. Maybe the company's harassment policy or training can be
considered defective in some way. Maybe the plaintiff can persuade a judge or jury
that she is a victim who did all she could and the company should be responsible for
whatever happened.' 2
There is also the potential that women will suffer in their employment prospects as
employers react to increased costs of sexual harassment litigation by hiring fewer
female employees and lowering salaries. °3
2. Policy-Making Impact
One likely benefit of the Court's decision in Ellerth is that employers will be
encouraged to promulgate more extensive anti-harassment policies and procedures
98. See id. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. See Turner, supra note 2, at 840 ("As we have witnessed in Meritor and other cases, employers
are not necessarily strictly and automatically liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by an
individual's ... supervisor.").
100. See Anita K. Blair, Harassment Law: More Confused Than Ever, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1998,
at A14.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
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in order to avoid liability for sexual harassment. 4 But company policies and
procedures do not come without a cost: some large companies already spend
millions of dollars each year on training programs and outside consultants in order
to ensure that employees know the scope of permissible conduct.' The likelihood
of expanded employer liability under the Court's holding in Ellerth has the potential
to significantly increase this spending on training programs. " An interesting aspect
of this potential increase in employer spending on policies, procedures and training
is the possibility that a whole new industry of consultants and trainers will evolve in
order to fill employers' needs in this area. 7 Professor David Oppenheimer of
Golden Gate University School of Law commented that he believes the Ellerth
decision is "going to have a very major impact in the legal community in terms of
establishing a cottage industry of trainers who will develop and train employees on
anti-sexual-harassment policies.' 0 8
While the Court's decision in Ellerth seems to encourage development of
comprehensive anti-harassment policies, simply having procedures in place may not
be sufficient."° The Court clearly stated in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton" that
failure to communicate existing sexual harassment policies to all employees was
unreasonable, and could result in employer liability for supervisor sexual
hiarassment."' However, creating comprehensive anti-harassment policies and
ensuring that all employees are aware of them may not be enough to shield employers
from liability."' As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent in Ellerth, "employers will
be liable notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even though they acted reason-
ably" by having adequate policies and procedures in place." 3 Unless an employer
104. See Robert D. Lipman & David A. Robins, Court's Harassment Rulings Provide Ammunition
for Both Sides, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1998, at col. 1.
105. See Edward Felsenthal, High Court Finishes Term With Decisions Involving Workplace
Environment, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A3 (discussing the impact of the Court's sexual
harassment decision in Ellerth on employers).
106. See Blair, supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for greatly increased
litigation as a result of Ellerth's holding).
107. See Marcia Coyle, Sex Harassment Redefined in Several Rulings, High Court Ends Confusion
Over Employer Liability, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998, at Al.
108. Id.
109. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) ("Title VII is designed to
encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.").
110. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
I 11. See id.; Amy Karff Halevy & Ryan J. Maierson, The Supreme Court Changes the Rules on
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 36 Hous. LAW. REV. 53, 57 (1998) (stating that an
employer was found liable for unreasonably failing to disseminate harassment policies to employees in
remote locations).
112. See id. ( "The Court apparently requires the employer to establish both its own reasonable
conduct and the employee's unreasonable conduct." ).
113. See Ellerth., 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
can also prove that the employee acted unreasonably by not availing himself or
herself of the existing policies or procedures, the second prong of the employer's
affirmative defense fails and the employer will be found liable." 4
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution
One approach that employers may take in this area is to create alternative dispute
resolution (hereinafter "ADR") procedures, such as arbitrating sexual harassment
claims, in order to meet the Court's reasonable efforts prong of the affirmative
defense.' ' One drawback to this scenario is the potential that employers will require
submission of sexual harassment claims to an ADR process as a condition of
employment, thus preventing individuals from having their day in court." 6 The
employer would also likely point to a refusal by an employee to comply with such a
procedure as being unreasonable, thereby satisfying the second prong of the
employer's affirmative defense.'
This scenario, however, might not be as easy for employers as simply including
a compulsory arbitration clause in all employment contracts. In Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., "' the, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
compulsory arbitration clauses cannot be used in employment contracts to force
employees to arbitrate sexual harassment or other civil rights claims under Title VII
unless the employee enters arbitration voluntarily." 9 However, this holding is far
from a consensus: as other courts of appeals addressing the issue have enforced
compulsory arbitration clauses in employment contracts, even in the context of
sexual harassment claims under Title VII.
20
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims, but it has held that discrimination claims brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act' 2' are subject to compulsory
114. See Halevy, supra note 111, at 57 (stating that the second prong of the affirmative defense
requires the employer to show that the employee failed to use the employer's preventive or corrective
opportunities).
115. See Dominic Bencivenga, Workplace Harassment, Wise Employers Adopt Full Remedial
Programs, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1998, at col. 2.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. 144 F.3d 1182, 1182(9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998).
119. See id. at 1190 (holding that Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes compulsory arbitration of civil
rights claims).
120. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1028 (1999) (holding that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims are permissible);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11 th Cir. 1998) (same); Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875,
881 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Willis
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (same).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 621-39 (1998).
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arbitration pursuant to agreements in securities registration applications.1 12 While
this decision certainly is not dispositive as to the Court's position concerning
compulsory arbitration agreements for Title VII claims, commentators claim that the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Duffield was surprising.2 2 By affirming the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court essentially favors a dual system of justice for
employees required to sign compulsory arbitration agreements: those who bring an
action in the nine western states of the Ninth Circuit will be allowed access to the
courts to pursue Title VII claims, while employees in all other circuits will not.'
24
For national corporations with offices across the country this result is truly
anomalous, because some employees will have the option to sue in court for Title VII
claims while others in the same company will be forced into compulsory
arbitration. 1
25
B. Judicial Impact
1. Differing Standards for Employer Liability
As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent in Ellerth, there seems to be no logic to
different standards for employer liability under Title VII based on claims of racial
versus sexual discrimination. 126 The likely result of the Court's holding in Ellerth is
that plaintiffs in racial discrimination cases will argue in favor of an employers' strict
liability for hostile environment harassment and sexual harassment claims.
Consequently, courts will realize an expanded number of racial discrimination or
harassment claims filed under Title VII. 127 How can judges argue with that logic?
A Title VII claim should be a Title VII claim, whether? based on sexual or racial
harassment.2'
122. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991) (holding that compulsory
arbitration of ADEA claims pursuant to arbitration agreements was not inconsistent with the purpose
of the Act).
123. See Patrick McGeehan, Ruling Stands on Arbitrating Bias Claims, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1998,
at B 12.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127. See Lipman, supra note 104.
128. See Edward T. Ellis & Tara L. Eyer, Racial Harassment and How Employers Try to Prevent
It, SD06 ALI-ABA 695,697, July 23, 1998 (stating that "courts have generally applied and transferred
the same principles to workplace harassment claims regardless of whether the harassment was based
on sex or race"); see also Harrison v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Co., 80 F.3d 1107, 1118
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 169 (1996) (stating that the elements and burdens of proof are
the same for racial and sexual harassment claims under Title VI); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45
2. Many Questions Left Unanswered
While the Court's decision in Ellerth resolved important issues concerning
hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII, it also raised
many others. 29 For example, when will the workplace harasser be considered a
supervisor for purposes of holding the employer liable for the conduct? 130 The Court
stated that an employer is vicariously liable for the harassing conduct of "a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee."'' 3'
In a company with a traditional linear hierarchy, the meaning of this language is
clear. 32 But modem business structures do not always fit into such neat classifica-
tions.'33 Many modem companies have more flexible business structures, with
employees working in team environments, and with a constant reshuffling of
personnel.' As one commentator notes, "[i]n such cases, it is a sure bet employers
will argue that their liability should be evaluated under the more forgiving traditional
negligence standard which continues to apply when the harasser and the victim are
coworkers."''
35
Another major issue resulting from the Ellerth decision is how lower courts
should interpret and apply the two-part employer affirmative defense announced by
the Court. 136 The Court stated that employers can assert this defense by proving "(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise."' 137 This definition further raises the following
questions: 1) what constitutes reasonable measures taken by employers; 2) what steps
must an employer take to correct harassing behavior; 3) what steps must an employee
take to fulfill his or her requirement of reasonable conduct to avoid harm; 38 and 4)
what does the phrase "avoid harm otherwise" mean? Does it require the employee
F.3d 744, 753, n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "[tihe Court has recognized no difference in standards
applicable to racially and sexually hostile work environments").
129. See Michel Lee, Last Term's Employment Decisions Have Shaken Up the Status Quo, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 28, 1998, at col. 1.
130. See id.
131. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
132. See Lee, supra note 129 (stating that "[a]pplied to a traditionally chain-of-command structured
workplace the import of this [the Court's] language is clear").
133. See id.
134. See id. ("Many organizations function along a more interactive or team approach method of
operation. In some instances, an individual may report to a given manager only with respect to one
aspect of a job.").
135. Id.
136. See id. (noting that "there is the conundrum of the Court's affirmative defense, virtually every
word of which inspires questions").
137. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
138. See Lee, supra note 129.
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to limit his or her contact with the harassing supervisor as much as possible,
especially during nonworking hours? 3 9 Because these questions are fact specific
determinations with which lower courts must now deal, it seems likely that summary
judgment in sexual harassment cases will be much more difficult for litigants to
obtain in the future. 140
VI. CONCLUSION
While the irony of Justice Thomas' whole-cloth creation idiom used in reference
to the Court's decision in a case involving Burlington Industries should not be lost
on us, his point should be taken seriously.' 4' As discussed supra, with so many
unanswered questions resulting from the Court's ruling in Ellerth, especially
concerning the new affirmative defense, lower courts will likely struggle with the
application of the new standards for employer vicarious liability for sexual
harassment. 142 But when looking at the big picture, most commentators agree that the
decision in Ellerth was a positive step by the Court to address the growing problem
of workplace sexual harassment. 14' Despite the litany of questions left unanswered
by Ellerth, the emphasis the Court placed on employers promulgating adequate anti-
harassment policies and procedures can only help reduce the incidents of sexual
harassment by supervisors in the workplace."'4
JOHN CORRINGTON
139. See Jason L. Gunter & Tammie L. Rattray, Recent Developments in Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment - Ellerth and Faragher, 72 FLA. B.J. 94, 98 (1998) (discussing potential problems
with the Ellerth affirmative defense).
140. See Lee, supra note 129.
141. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2273 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("This [vicarious employer liability] rule is a whole-cloth creation that draws no support from the legal
principles on which the Court claims it is based.").
142. See discussion supra, Part V.B.2.
143. See Lee, supra note 129 ("The resulting ruling[] bring[s] a considerable measure of order and
even a dollop of common sense to this increasingly active area of the federal law."); Lipman, supra
note 104 ("[T]he Court has indeed clarified this murky area of the law."); Halevy, supra note Ill
("Ellerth ...reinforce[s] the critical role of an effective anti-harassment policy and grievance
procedure.").
144. See Felsenthal, supra note 105 (noting that "[t]he ruling will create a huge incentive for
companies to establish tough anti-harassment programs with effective grievance procedures.").

